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CALIFORNIA UNLAWFUL DETAINER PROCEDURE-A
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
California's unlawful detainer procedure1 is enmeshed in a com-
mon legal predicament-how to satisfy the natural desires of two tra-
ditionally hostile interest groups facing one another in a highly charged
atmosphere. The purpose of this Note is to describe the present di-
lemma from the point of view of both landlord and tenat, taking into
consideration recent amendments and attempted revisions of existing stat-
utes. After noting the inadequacies of the present unlawful detainer
system in California, the author concludes by suggesting, in general
terms, a legislative remedy.
The author does not attempt to summarize or review all, or even
most, of California's unlawful detainer law; this has been done
thoroughly and accurately elsewhere.' This Note proceeds on the
assumptions that the reader has a general understanding of unlawful
detainer law, and that the parties in any of the examples used herein
have complied with all preliminary and technical procedural rules, un-
less otherwise noted.
3
I. Inadequacies of California's Unlawful Detainer Procedure
as Seen by the Landlord
There are two major areas of landlord dissatisfaction: (1) The
costs involved in ousting an undesirable tenant, and (2) the measure of
damages allowed upon obtaining judgment in unlawful detainer.
A. Costs
The costs involved in removing an undesirable tenant are often so
prohibitive that one landlord representative advises his clients to give
their undesirable tenants a free month's rent and/or relocation assist-
ance if the tenant will vacate without the necessity of legal process. 4
1. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 792, 1946; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1159-79a.
2. E.g., J. GODDARD, CALIFORNIA LANDLORD AND TENANT LAw AND PROCEDURE
80-112 (4th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as GODDARD]; LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 540-78 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
CEB-REAL ESTATE]; V. HUNT, MANUAL OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE IN CALIFORNIA (1948).
3. It should also be noted that this article deals primarily with residential
short-term leases (one year or less) although in most instances the rasoning can be
applied to a commercial situation.
4. Telephone Interview with Joseph A. Brown, Founder and General Counsel
for Apartment House Industry of San Francisco, Sept. 5, 1969 [hereinafter cited as
Brown Interview].
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One practice text suggests avoiding an unlawful detainer action if at all
possible because of the high costs.' The breakdown of these costs
follows.6
1. Attorney's Fee
The minimum fees required by an attorney to take all steps neces-
sary to oust the tenant range from $200 to $500 in metropolitan areas.
7
This figure will increase if an appeal is taken or if complications arise.8
In the absence of an express lease provision, attorney's fees are not re-
coverable from a defaulting tenant.'
2. Judicial Costs
Ancillary to litigation, but apart from attorney's fees, are judicial
costs. Examples are filing costs, 10 service costs,
1 and jury costs.' 2
Unlike attorney's fees, these costs are recoverable from the defendant-
tenant in an unlawful detainer action.' 3 Note, however, that if despite
all the above mentioned preliminary expenditures, the tenant is still in
possession, the additional and very considerable cost of a sheriff's evic-
tion must be sustained.
3. Eviction Costs
For service of the writ of possession, the landlord must pay $10 plus
70 cents per mile, one-way. 4 If the service of the writ of possession and
5. CEB-REAL ESTATE, supra note 2, at 540-41. In considering this landlord
complaint, it should be kept in mind that many landlords are small operators and prob-
ably not "rich." Statement by Jeremy Ets-Hokin, Interim Hearings on Housing Be-
fore the Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Economy 83 (San Francisco
Dec. 12, 1968).
6. The writer assumes here that litigation is necessary because the tenant is
guilty of unlawful detainer, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1161(1)-(4), and refuses to
comply or quit.
7. THE LAWYER'S CLUB OF SAN FRANCISCO, SCHEDULE OF MINIMUM FEES 17
(1969-70) [hereinafter cited as MINIMUM FEES]. The services include the notice to
vacate, commencement of the action, securing the judgment and executing the writ of
possession. Cf. LAWYER'S DIARY AND MANUAL 167-74 (1969).
8. Cf. LAWYER'S DIARY AND MANUAL 167-74 (1969).
9. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1021. Of course, most leases or rental agreements
contain such a provision; however, if the tenant is insolvent, such an agreement is of
little practical significance to a landlord. See note 24 & accompanying text infra.
10. LAWYER'S DIARY AND MANUAL 90-91 (1969).
11. Id. at 93.
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE H§ 28102-58. This assumes that the landlord elects to
have a jury. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1171. Usually, however, it will be the tenant
who requests the jury. Brown Interview, supra note 4.
13. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174.
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE 99 26733, 26746. Mileage is measured from the sheriff's
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notice to vacate' 5 is unsuccessful in regaining possession, forcible evic-
tion by the sheriff becomes necessary.
Before they will act, enforcement officers require a substantial
deposit to cover their costs."6 In populous counties, representative
amounts for this deposit are: $75 per room,
17 or flat fees of $20018
or $250.10 Less populous counties, where the remedy is less often
used, and/or less expensive enforcement techniques are employed, may
charge considerably less.2" Nonetheless, in all likelihood, a landlord
will have to expend at least $400 for attorney's fees and eviction costs
office to the place of service. See CALIFORNIA STATE SHERIFFS' ASS'N, CIVIL PROCEDURE
MANUAL § 4.21, at 84-85 (1969).
15. See note 30 & accompanying text infra.
16. The authority to charge for services is found in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6100.
Payment in advance is authorized by CAL. GOV'T CODE § 24350.5. Actual fee amounts,
as determined by specific sections of the Government Code, are authorized by CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 26720 (sheriff), 27821 (constable), 71266 (marshall). The specific
section authorizing a fee for moving costs is CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26748. See also
CALIFORNIA STATE SHERIFFS' ASs'N, CIVIL PROCEDURE MANUAL §§ 4.6-.8, at 74-75
(1969).
17. Telephone Interview with Sgt. White, Sheriff's Department of Alameda
County, Sept. 19, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Alameda Sheriff Interview]. Alameda
population was 1,127 thousand by October 1968. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANALYSIS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
-OAKLAND CALIFORNIA HOUSING MARKET App., Table IV (Mar. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as HOUSING MARKET].
18. Telephone Interview with Capt. Blasser, Sheriff's Department of San Mateo
County, Sept. 19, 1969 [hereinafter cited as San Mateo Sheriff Interview]. The popu-
lation of San Mateo County was 590 thousand by October 1968. HOUSING MARKET,
supra note 17, at App., Table IV.
19. Interview with Chief Deputy Sheriff Carl M. Olsen, Sheriff's Department of
San Francisco City and County, Aug. 12, 1969 [hereinafter cited as San Francisco
Sheriff Interview]. San Francisco City and County population was 762 thousand by
October 1968. HOUSING MARKET, supra note 17, at App., Table IV.
20. Marin County charges a $65 flat fee. Telephone Interview with Mrs.
Machato, Sheriff's Department of Marin County, Sept. 19, 1969 [hereinafter cited as
Marin Sheriff Interview]. Marin County population was 214 thousand by October
1968. HOUSING MARKET, supra note 17, at App., Table IV. For techniques used see
notes 43 & 183 infra; the frequency of use in fiscal 1969 was as follows:
San Francisco 667*
Alameda 600 (approx.)
San Mateo 320 (approx.)
Marin 120 (approx.)
These figures are based on a report from San Francisco and interviews with
Sheriff's representatives in the counties affected. See notes 17-20 supra.
*This figure includes 161 from San Francisco Housing Authority, which recently
lifted its moratorium on evictions. This somewhat distorts San Francisco figures up-
wards since the Housing Authority is now in a catching up phase. Telephone Interview
with John Sullivan, General Counsel to the San Francisco Housing Authority, Sept. 23,
1969 [hereinafter cited as Sullivan Interview].
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in addition to the sum required for judicial costs and costs for service
of the writ of possession.21
With the exception of the attorney's fee,22 the above costs are re-
coverable in the unlawful detainer judgment against the tenant.23
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, it seems unlikely that a tenant who
has let matters progress to this stage will be able to pay.24
It is not surprising that in 1967 landlords attempted by legislation
to shift the burden of these recoverable costs to the county in which the
writ of possession was awarded. Assembly Bill 1648, amending Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 1174, was enacted and by its
terms placed the expense of service and eviction upon the enforcing
county.25  The statute, however, was not widely enforced 26 and within
a year was declared unconstitutional as an unlawful expenditure of
public money for private benefit.2
Repeal of this amendment to section 1174 came in 1968 with the
adoption of Assembly Bill 387. This legislation, however, did not re-
store the status quo ante,28 rather, it added new dimensions to the
cost situation involved in unlawful detainer procedure.
21. Undoubtedly the figure is higher since few attorneys are likely to charge the
minimum figure. Consider also that the aforementioned sheriff's deposits only apply
to residential evictions. Commercial evictions can be frighteningly expensive. One
recent eviction inventory of a San Francisco parts warehouse cost $1500-moving the
goods out would have involved an additional expense. San Francisco Sheriff Interview,
supra note 19.
22. See note 9 & accompanying text supra.
23. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 1034.5, 1174.
24. CEB-REAL ESTATE, supra note 2, at 541.
25. Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1600, § 2, at 3830 (effective Nov. 8, 1967): "[The
landlord] shall be entitled to have the premises restored to him by officers charged
with enforcement of such writs without payment of any fees in connection herewith.
All goods, chattels or personal property of the tenant remaining on the premises
at the time of its restoration to the plaintiff, shall be stored by the county .... Id.
§ 2, at 3831 (emphasis added).
This legislation received strong support from major landlord organizations. Inter-
view with Robert Gnaizda, staff member of California Rural Legal Assistance Founda-
tion, in San Francisco, Sept. 4, 1969; San Francisco Sheriff Interview, supra note 19.
26. San Francisco Sheriff Interview, supra note 19; II CONTINUING EDUCATION
OF THE BAR, LEGAL SERVICEs GAZETTE 71 (Aug.-Sept. 1968) [hereinafter cited
95 CEB-GAZETTE]. One county that did enforce the amendment found it rather
expensive-$ 15,000 for less than one year. San Mateo Sheriff Interview, supra note
18.
27. Phillips v. Davenport, Civ. No. 64125 (Monterey Super. Ct., Dec. 1, 1967), in
CEB-GAZETTE, supra note 26, at 70; Lopez v. Kelsay, No. 97628 (Stanislaus Super.
Ct., Apr. 22, 1968), in CEB-GAzETTE, supra note 26, at 243. The statutory basis
for the decisions is CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 25.
28. Compare Cal. Stats. 1945, ch. 593, § 1, at 1126, with Cal. Stats. 1968, ch.
102, § 2, at 314.
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Perhaps the most effective of the amendment's additions to Cali-
fornia's unlawful detainer procedure (section 1174) is the five day pe-
riod which the enforcing officer must give to the tenant between the time
the writ of possession is served and the time when the writ of possession
can be enforced by eviction. 9 In conjunction with this five day period,
sheriffs often use a notice to vacate that is printed in headline size type
and unmistakably informs the tenant he must vacate within the period
or be evicted by the sheriff.3" The net effect of the notice and the five
day period has been to encourage more tenants to vacate voluntarily.81
The cost advantage to the landlord is obvious: If the tenant moves
voluntarily, the landlord doesn't have to put up a large moving deposit,82
or later try to recover frem the tenant money spent for the eviction.
33
The 1968 amendment to section 1174 also permits the landlord to
store his evicted tenant's belongings "on the premises"34 rather than
move them out as previously required.35 This, of course, relieves the
landlord from shouldering the burden of the moving deposit. The term
"on the premises," however, seems to require using the rental unit itself
for the storage. This is a reasonable interpretation since the storage
cost allowed to the landlord in his supplemental cost bill36 is based on
the reasonable value of the premises.3" Note, nonetheless, that while the
landlord avoids the moving deposit, he ties up his property for 30
days-the period of storage required under the amended statute.38
Thus, the victory is a Pyrrhic one if the lost rent for this period is not
recoverable" and equals or exceeds the avoided moving cost.
In addition to the above changes another cost item was added
to California's unlawful detainer procedure.40 An inventory of all the
29. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174.
30. This form apparently originated with Capt. Blasser of the San Mateo County
Sheriff's Office. San Francisco Sheriff Interview, supra note 19; San Mateo Sheriff
Interview, supra note 18. There is no formal requirement that notice be given in
this manner. Under previous law, no stay was provided for except in special cases;
thus, no preliminary notice had to precede service or enforcement of the writ. See
Cal. Stats. 1945, ch. 593, § 1, at 1126.
31. Alameda Sheriff Interview, supra note 17; Brown Interview, supra note 4;
San Francisco Sheriff Interview, supra note 19; San Mateo Sheriff Interview, supra
note 18.
32. See notes 16-19 & accompanying text supra.
33. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1034.5, 1174; see text accompanying note 24
supra.
34. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1174. This assumes that the tenant does not move
his belongings out during the five day period.
35. Shemanski v. Sair, 124 Cal. App. 2d 885, 886-87, 268 P.2d 576, 577 (Super.
Ct. App. Dep't 1954), construing Cal. Stats. 1945, ch. 593, § 1, at 1126.
36. See CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1034.5.
37. CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. § 1174.
38. Id.
39. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
40. Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 102, § 2, at 314.
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tenant's belongings remaining on the premises is now required, regard-
less of whether they are stored on the premises or moved to a public
warehouse. 4' Such an inventory must either be made or verified by the
sheriff.42  Depending on the technique used, 43 this additional expense
can be considerable.
44
Finally, in connection with the storage and inventory provisions,
the amended version of section 1174, added a presumption that the
tenant has abandoned his belongings after they have been stored and
unclaimed45 for the required 30 days.46  This same addition provides
for the disposal of the goods at a public sale with the proceeds going
first to pay the judgment, judicial costs, eviction costs, and costs of sale;
the balance, if any, going to the tenant.
47
The 1968 amendment to section 1174 did not, however, define
"public sale" and thus some doubt existed about what was meant.48
To clarify this point, the 1969 California Legislature again amended
section 1174 by adding the following definitive language:
[At a public sale] by competitive bidding, to be held at the
place where the property is stored, after notice of the time and
place of such sale has been given at least five days before the date
of such sale by publication once in a newspaper of general circula-
tion published in the county in which the sale is to be held. Notice
of the public sale may not be given more than five days prior to
the expiration of the 30 days during which the property is held in
storage.
49
There is one additional problem relative to public sale of the ten-
ant's belonging which should be mentioned. If the tenant's belongings
are relatively valueless and, when sold, do not cover the costs of sale,
the landlord suffers this additional expense. On the other hand, if the
41. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174. There was no former requirement of an in-
ventory.
42. Id.
43. San Francisco Sheriff Interview, supra note 19 (highly detailed inventory);
Matin Sheriff Interview, supra note 20 (minimum detail).
44. The charge in San Francisco is $20 per hour per man. San Francisco
Sheriff Interview, supra note 19.
45. The tenant may reclaim his belongings only after he has paid the judgment
and all costs. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174.
46. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174. In the case notes 100, 102 infra, the
tenant argued that this presumption was unconstitutional because it was not based on
incontrovertible facts and thus denied him due process in the taking of his property.
In support, the tenant's memorandum cited Heiner v. Donna, 285 U.S. 312 (1932);
Schlessinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 236 (1926).
47. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1174.
48. San Francisco Sheriff Interview, supra note 19. It could be argued that the
terminology did not mean a sheriff's sale since the sheriff did not take possession of
the tenant's belongings.
49. Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 480, § 1, at 20 (Deering's Adv. Leg. Serv. 1969)
(effective Nov. 10, 1969).
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landlord disposes of the goods outside the terms of the statute, i.e., other
than by public sale, he may be liable in a conversion action brought by
the tenant.50
Thus, if one balances these relevant factors, Assembly Bill 387,r"
amending section 1174 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reduces the
landlord's eviction costs only to the extent the tenant voluntarily vacates
under the new five day notice. 52 However, where the tenant is ob-
stinate and refuses to vacate voluntarily, it puts an additional cost bur-
den on the landlord.53
B. Damages Obtainable upon Judgment
Under California's present unlawful detainer procedure, landlords
cannot recover, as damages, the, loss of future rent. In other words,
the landlord who prevails in the unlawful detainer trial is awarded
possession, and only incidentally, rent and damages accrued to the time
of trial. 4 He cannot recover any sum based on lost future rents as a
result of the breach that occasioned the unlawful detainer action.55 If the
lease is forfeited in the action, the tenant's obligation to pay rent ceases
and no further recovery by the landlord is possible.5 Suppose, how-
ever, that the landlord wants to evict the tenant and still hold him
responsible for any future rent loss that the landlord may sustain. Is
this possible?
While there is no case authority in point, persuasive arguments can
be found in a study and recommendation made by the California Law
Revision Commission. 7 There, the conclusion is reached that the only
50. See generally Comment, The Unclaimed Personal Property Problem: A Leg-
islative Proposal, 19 STAN. L. REv. 619 (1967). Unfortunately, there appears to be no
solution to this problem that will satisfy both competing interests. The law as
amended is probably as satisfactory as any other possible solution. Fortunately, the
problem is not a large one.
51. Enacted in Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 102, § 2, at 314.
52. See notes 29-33 & accompanying text supra.
53. See notes 40-50 & accompanying text supra.
54. Markham v. Fralick, 2 Cal. 2d 221, 227, 39 P.2d 804, 807 (1934); Fontana
Ind. v. Western Grain Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 408, 411, 334 P.2d 611, 613 (1959);
Garfinkle v. Montgomery, 113 Cal. App. 2d 149, 153, 248 P.2d 52, 54 (1952). Dam-
ages include all those reasonably flowing from the unlawful detention up to the time
of judgment. See cases cited supra; Roberts v. Redlich, 111 Cal. App. 2d 566, 569,
244 P.2d 933, 935 (1952).
55. Cavanaugh v. High, 182 Cal. App. 2d 714, 722-23, 6 Cal. Rptr. 525, 531
(1960).
56. Costello v. Martin Bros., 74 Cal. App. 782, 786, 241 P. 588, 589-90 (1925)
(dictum).
57. Harvey, A Study to Determine Whether the Rights and Duties Attendant
upon the Termination of a Lease Should Be Revised, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1141 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Harvey]; CALIFORNIA LAW REviSION COMMISSION, RE6COMMENDA-
TION RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY LEASES 401 (Oct. 1968) [hereinafter cited as LAw
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way, under present law, that the landlord can recover future rent is by
the unsure procedure of continuing the lease in force after receiving the
unlawful detainer judgment and suing for the accrued rent at the end
of the original lease term."' This remedy, however, is unsatisfactory on
several counts. First, if the lease is for a very long period, suing at the
end of the term may be fruitless, especially if the tenant dies, leaves the
jurisdiction, or becomes insolvent. Second, the landlord must be very
careful to notify the tenant that he is reletting for the tenant's account;
such a reletting may otherwise work a surrender by operation of law."0
Third, if the landlord chooses to leave the premises vacant and to sue
the tenant after expiration of the leasehold, the issues of mitigation of
damages and forefeiture can be raised by the tenant. 0 Should the
landlord choose the last alternative, he must act in a manner consistent
with the tenant's continued right to possession or risk a surrender by
operation of law. 6
In passing, it should be noted that the landlord can have his dam-
age award tripled if the tenant's unlawful detainer is shown to be wilful
-not a good faith holding by the tenant. 2 Such an award, however, is
discretionary with the trial court,63 and because of its penal nature, the
statute providing for it is strictly construed.6" Thus, recovery of triple
damages is only a possibility and will not normally compensate the
landlord for his inability to collect future rent.
II. Inadequacies of California's Unlawful Detainer Procedure
as Seen by the Tenant
Tenant dissatisfaction with California's unlawful detainer proce-
dure is based primarily on the federal and state constitutional consider-
REVISION COMM'N RECOMMENDATION]. The cases cited in the above sources, and the
cases cited in notes 59 & 61 inIra, relate to the situation occurring after an abandon-
ment-not after an eviction or judgment in unlawful detainer.
58. Harvey 1169; LAW REVISION COMM'N RECOMMENDATION 408-09. This as-
sumes that there is no specific lease provision. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3308; Harvey
1174-77.
59. LAW REVISION COMM'N RECOMMENDATION 408. See, e.g., Yates v. Reid, 36
Cal. 2d 383, 385, 224 P.2d 8, 9 (1950); Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 513-14, 27 P.
369, 370 (1891); Dorcich v. Time Oil Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 677, 683-88, 230 P.2d 10,
13-17 (1951). But see De Hart v. Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829, 832, 161 P.2d 453, 455
(1945).
60. See LAW REVISION COMM'N RECOMMENDATION 409-12; Harvey 1170.
61. LAW REVISION COMM'N RECOMMENDATION 408; see cases cited note 59
supra; cf. Garfinkle v. Montgomery, 113 Cal. App. 2d 149, 155, 248 P.2d 52, 56
(1952).
62. E.g., Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 485, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9, 14-15
(1963); Gwinn v. Goldman, 57 Cal. App. 2d 393, 399-401, 134 P.2d 915, 917-19
(1943); see CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1174.
63. See cases cited note 62 supra.
64. Gwinn v. Goldman, 57 Cal. App. 2d 393, 399, 134 P.2d 915, 918 (1942).
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ations of due process and equal protection.6 5 Other tenant objections
are based on the costs and the mechanics of the unlawful detainer pro-
cedure.
A. Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims Usually Not Allowed
This challenge stems from the summary nature66 of the unlawful
detainer remedy. To preserve the summary nature of the proceeding,
possession is made the sole issue;67 counterclaims and affirmative de-
fenses are almost always excluded."" This exclusion results in a basic
inequality between the landlord-plaintiff and the tenant-defendant.
The best compendium of arguments illustrating this inequality is found
in a recent petition urging the convening of a three judge federal court
to review California's unlawful detainer procedure.6 9
The case arose when a landlord sought to evict four of his tenants
for nonpayment of rent. During the unlawful detainer proceeding,
evidence on several affirmative defenses70 was refused as being inad-
missible in such an action. The landlord was given judgment for
possession; a stay of execution on the writ of possession was refused,
despite the offer of a bond sufficient in amount to cover the judgment,
costs and rents that would accrue pending the appeal. In response, the
Alameda County Legal Aid Society, representing the tenants,7' filed a
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13. The California
Constitution article 1, section 13 is by its terms applicable only to criminal proceedings.
It has been held, however, to be identical in scope and purpose with the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. Manford v. Singh, 40 Cal. App. 700,
701, 181 P. 844 (1919).
66. E.g., Knowles v. Robinson, 60 Cal. 2d 620, 625, 387 P.2d 833, 836, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 36 (1963); Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 145-47, 146 P. 423, 424
(1915).
67. Fontana Ind. v. Western Grain Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 408, 411, 334 P.2d
611, 613 (1959).
68. See cases cited note 66 supra. For exceptions see notes 91-92 infra.
69. Petitioner's Brief in Support of Convening a Three Judge Court, Hutcherson
v. Lehtin, Civ. No. 52196 (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 9, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Pe-
titioner's Brief]. For disposition of the case, see note 185 infra.
70. The affirmative defenses were centered around the argument that no rent (or
at least diminished rent) was due because the building was seriously dilapidated.
These defenses were framed in the following terms: The lease was entered into for an
illegal purpose (code violations were preexisting); failure of consideration; con-
structive eviction; unclean hands; retaliatory eviction (possible free speech issue); and
racial discrimination because the level of services had declined when the building be-
came predominantly occupied by black persons. Petitioner's Brief at 3.
71. There were originally four tenants who lost in the unlawful detainer trial
and who subsequently joined in this action, which was brought as a class action on be-
half of all tenants of substandard housing. Despite the temporary restraining order
preventing their eviction until a decision was rendered, two of the original four tenants
vacated the premises during the pendency of this action.
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petition for convening a three judge court and requested that a tempo-
rary restraining order be directed to the Sheriff of Alameda County to
prevent enforcement of the writ of possession. The temporary restrain-
ing order was issued, and on October 3, 1969, a three judge federal
court72 convened to hear arguments on the points raised by the tenants'
counsel.
Counsel for the tenants argued that decisions of the United States
Supreme Court require equal treatment of plaintiff and defendant,7"
and that procedural technicalities can produce inequalities. 4 In their
petition, counsel for the tenants described the procedural technicalities
that place the tenant on unequal footing with the landlord in an unlawful
detainer action:
1. If the landlord brought a common law action for rent or eject-
ment, the tenants' defenses or counterclaims could be raised.75 To deny
a tenant this right in an unlawful detainer proceeding forces him to bring
a separate suit to assert these claims. This places a difficult and irrep-
arable burden on the tenant, particularly if he is raising the defense
that the premises are uninhabitable,-c and/or if he is poor, which is
normally the case with persons living in substandard housing.
77
2. In the tenant's separate suit the landlord can raise any de-
fenses or counterclaims available to him;78 the tenant is not afforded the
same privilege when the landlord is suing him in unlawful detainer.
3. In the tenant's separate damage action, the landlord can stay
execution on appeal (if the tenant wins) as a matter of right by posting
a sufficient bond;79 when the landlord wins an unlawful detainer suit, a
stay on appeal for the tenant is only discretionary despite the posting of
an adequate bond.
80
4. In an unlawful detainer action the landlord has the possibility
72. The three judge federal court consisted of United States District Judges
William T. Sweigert and Gerald S. Levin, and United States Circuit Judge Ben C. Duni-
way (all from the Ninth Judicial Circuit).
73. Petitioner's Brief at 8, citing Gulf v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
74. Id. at 9, citing Griffin v. United States, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
75. Id. at 7. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 437, 438, construed in Lawrence
Barker Inc. v. Briggs, 39 Cal. 2d 654, 661, 248 P.2d 897, 901 (1952). See generally
Howell, Counterclaims and Cross Complaints in California, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 415
(1937).
76. Based on CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1941, 1942.
77. See SAN FRANCISCO DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, IsSUEs IN HOUSING 9-11,
24, 32, 34 (Housing Report No. 2, July 1969); Petitioner's Brief at 12-13, citing P.
DOUGLAS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS 76 (1969);
KERNER REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 467
(N.Y. Times ed. 1968).
78. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 438; Petitioner's Brief at 6, 7, 14.
79. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 942; Petitioner's Brief at 4.
80. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1176; Petitioner's Brief at 10.
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of receiving triple damages; s' no similar opportunity is provided for the
tenant in his separate damage suit.
5. The landlord's unlawful detainer suit is given a preference on
the court's calendar, 2 the tenant's damage action is scheduled on the
normal supply and demand basis. This, in effect, makes unlawful de-
tainer summary for the landlord but not for the tenant. As a conse-
quence, the unlawful detainer procedure gives an unconstitutional pre-
ference to landlords because there is nothing inherent in the landlord's
claims that requires swifter handling.
In addition to the equal protection argument, the petition raised a
due process argument; 3 that is to say, no fair determination of tenants'
substantive rights84 can be made in the unlawful detainer proceeding
since these rights are precluded from being asserted therein. Because
the unlawful detainer procedure is summary and a stay of execution is
discretionary, the tenant may lose his valuable interest (the tenancy)
before receiving a full hearing. This violates a recently announced prin-
ciple that the scope of the hearing must be consistent with the burden to
be imposed. 5 In other words, if a person is to be ejected from his living
quarters, he is entitled to a more extensive hearing than the person
protesting a parking ticket, wherein the resulting loss will be a minimum
fine as compared with loss of habitation.
Although the arguments are sound and well-supported, there are
some serious deficiencies with this particular suit that may prevent its
success in the federal court. For example, there is no specific statutory
prohibition of affirmative defenses or counterclaims; the only applic-
able statute simply says that the tenant may either appear and answer
or demur.80 The prohibitions are found in case law and form only a
discouraging pattern,8" rather than an absolute prohibition. While
there are no cases that specifically deny the tenant defenses dis-
cussed above,8 8 their exclusion seems likely if the old pattern con-
tinues.8 9
81. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174; see notes 62-64 & accompanying text su-
pra.
82. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1179a; Petitioner's Brief at 9.
83. Based on U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. For instance, counterclaims.
85. Petitioner's Brief at 15-18 cites the following authority in support of this
proposition: Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted
sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382
F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1967); cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969).
86. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1170.
87. See cases cited note 66 supra.
88. See note 70 supra.
89. See cases cited note 66 supra.
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In addition, without a definitive pronouncement from the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court,90 the federal court may say that the case is pre-
mature, particularly in view of an exception to the no-defense rule
made for equitable defenses.91 This exception92 is not particularly
helpful to indigent tenants, however, since it requires the expense of a
separate injunctive action93 and is limited to equitable defenses.9 4
The federal court can also point to the California code section
allowing relief from forfeiture for hardship after an unlawful detainer
judgment95 and suggest that this remedy should have been invoked.
Any remedy here is illusory, however, since relief will only be granted
after judgment, when the tenant has paid all rent due, or fully per-
formed all conditions or covenants, so far as practicable. 6
B. Lack of an Exemption Provision in California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1174
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1174 provides for the
seizure and storage of tenants' goods remaining on the premises follow-
90. This was a statement from the bench by Circuit Judge Ben C. Duniway
during oral argument of Hutcherson v. Lehtin, Civ. No. 52196 (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 9,
1969), on October 3, 1969.
91. E.g., Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr.
309 (1962), wherein the tenant claimed he was being evicted because of his race
(Negro). The court of appeal ordered the trial court to admit proof on the issue be-
cause to refuse would constitute state action enforcing racial discrimination. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONSr. art. 1, § 13.
92. There are two other exceptions: (1) affirmative defenses or counterclaims
can be litigated in the unlawful detainer proceeding if possession is voluntarily aban-
doned subsequent to the commencement of the action. E.g., Knowles v. Robinson,
60 Cal. 2d 620, 625, 387 P.2d 833, 836, 36 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (1963); Erbe Corp. v.
W. & B. Realty Co., 255 Cal. App. 2d 773, 778, 63 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (1967);
Heller v. Melliday, 60 Cal. App. 2d 689, 696, 141 P.2d 447, 451 (1943). (2) If no
motion to strike the counterclaim is made during the proceeding, it can be decided on
appeal. Garfinkle v. Montgomery, 113 Cal. App. 2d 149, 155, 248 P.2d 52, 56
(1952).
93. See LAWYER'S DIARY AND MANUAL 90-91, 167-74 (1969).
94. See, e.g., Schubert v. Lowe, 193 Cal. 291, 295, 223 P. 550, 552 (1924);
Dennis v. Overholtzer, 149 Cal. App. 2d 101, 105, 307 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1957);
Rishwain v. Smith, 77 Cal. App. 2d 524, 531, 175 P.2d 555, 560 (1947); Knight v.
Black, 19 Cal. App. 518, 527, 126 P. 512, 516 (1912).
95. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1179.
96. Id.; see Reed v. South Shore Foods, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 2d 705, 713-17,
40 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-80 (1964) (dictum); Olympic Auditorium v. Superior Court, 81
Cal. App. 283, 287, 253 P.2d 944, 945 (1927); Cambridge v. Webb, 109 Cal. App. 2d
936, 938, 244 P.2d 505, 507 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1952).
There is also some question whether the trial judge specifically denied evidence
on all of the various defenses, see note 70 supra, or whether these defenses were even
made clear to him, see note 90 supra. Nonetheless. the case remains a valuable
resource for many constitutional challenges to California's unlawful detainer procedure.
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ing an eviction. This section, however, fails to exempt any of the ten-
ants' belongings from such seizure and storage.
There are at least three possible reasons for this omission: One
is that the California Legislature intended to omit such exemptions;
another is that the legislature felt the exemptions would be understood
to have been included and thus did not mention them' the third is that
the legislature failed to consider the problem at all.
The third reason seems implausible when one considers that the
1968 amendments to the Baggage Lien Laws,9 7 which contain exemp-
tion provisions, were considered at about the same time, and by the
same committee98 that considered the 1968 amendments to section
1174.o1 Assuming, therefore, that this third reason is incorrect, let us
examine the results flowing from the first and second reasons.
In a recent decision, the Alameda County Superior Court'00 appar-
ently proceeded on the assumption that the omission was intentional.
The court found this omission unconstitutional on the ground that it is
an unreasonable classification to allow exemptions in other attach-
ments or executions,' 0 ' but not in the execution of a writ of possession. 02
Consequently, the court ordered the sheriff to take custody of the ten-
ant's belongings and to move them to a public warehouse. 0 3  By so
doing, the sheriff became a "levying officer" within the terms of the
Code of Civil Procedure' and could lawfully be served with claims
of exemption under the aforementioned code sections.
In contrast to the above, a Los Angeles County Superior Court
refused to find a legislative intent to eliminate exemptions. 05 The
court suggested that the extensive exemption provisions found in the
Code of Civil Procedure section 690 and following, and the more
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1861, 1861a.
98. Assembly Judiciary Committee.
99. A.B. 301, amending CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1861, 1861a, was sent to commit-
tee February 2, 1968. A.B. 387, amending CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1174, and adding
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1034.5, was sent to committee February 8, 1968. 1968
FiNAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRs.
100. Nelson v. Madigan, OEO Pov. L. REP. 10,237 (Alameda County Super. Ct.,
June 20, 1969).
101. Under CAL. CIV. CODE § 1861, 1861a; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690 et seq.
102. An official memorandum of the court's conclusion of law has not been filed.
So far only the order to the sheriff has been issued. See note 103 & accompanying text
infra. That the foregoing is the court's reasoning is an interpolation from a suggested
memorandum of decision submitted to the court by the Alameda County Legal Aid
Society, which represented the plaintiff in seeking the writ of prohibition. A copy
of the Legal Aid Memorandum is on file with The Hastings Law Journal.
103. Alameda Sheriff Interview, supra note 17.
104. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690.26.
105. Shaby v. Deu Pree, Civ. No. 581,581 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., July 20,
1969), in The Recorder, (San Francisco), July 21, 1969, at 1, cols. 7-8.
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limited provisions in Civil Code sections 1861 and 1861a (Baggage
Lien Laws), indicated a legislative concern for the subject. The court
also noted that Civil Code section 1861a was amended in the same
legislative session as section 1174.1°' Thus, given the legislators' con-
cern and their recent activity in the area, the court would not find a
legislative intent to exclude exemptions from unlawful detainer pro-
ceedings absent a clear statement to that effect.
The court went on to state that there is no reason to restrict the
meaning of the words "levying officer" to a sheriff or marshal. Since
the landlord acquires control of the property by virtue of a writ of
possession, he "is, in legal contemplation, the 'levier.' ",107 Accord-
ingly, exemptions are possible under section 1174.
Although both of the above decisions permit exemption claims, the
Los Angeles decision seems preferable. In contrast to the Alameda
court, it did not arrive at its conclusion by invalidating existing law,1
08
nor does it necessitate removal of the goods from the premises. While
the Los Angeles decision provides a useful interim solution to the prob-
lem, it is hoped that legislative clarification is not far off.' °9
C. Costs
Tenants, like landlords, 110 also find the cost of unlawful detainer
prohibitive. Not only is there an attorney's fee for defense of the
action,"' and court costs" 2 if the tenant loses, but additional attor-
ney's fees are necessary if the tenant chooses to bring a separate dam-
age-counterclaim action."' There is also the very real, although some-
what elusive, cost of being dispossessed pending appeal," 4 especially
when one considers the limited housing available to the type of persons
most often evicted in an unlawful detainer action." 5
106. See note 99 supra.
107. Shaby v. Deu Pree, Civ. No. 581,581 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.,
July 20, 1969), in The Recorder (San Francisco) July 21, 1969, at 1, cols. 7-8.
108. That is, the landlord has a right under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174 to store
the tenant's goods on the premises. The Alameda County decision finds this uncon-
stitutional and invalidates it because of the lack of an exemption provision.
109. See text accompanying notes 171-72 inlra.
110. For the discussion of landlord's cost complaints see text accompanying
notes 4-53, supra.
Ill. This is similar in amount to the fee charged for bringing the action. Cf.
notes 7-8 supra.
112. See notes 10-12 supra.
113. The action must be separate because generally no counterclaims are al-
lowed in unlawful detainer actions. See notes 66-96 supra.
114. A stay of execution pending appeal is discretionary. See note 80 & accom-
panying text supra.




Another tenant criticism of California's unlawful detainer pro-
cedure is based on procedural considerations. The first problem is with
the type of service that the tenant may receive. At least one county
requires that the tenant be personally served with the notice to
appear.""' Since personal service is not specified in the statutes, how-
ever, other counties are not so diligent and readily resort to the "nail
and mail 1117 routine. If the process server is dishonest, if the notice
blows away or is removed by a third party, or if there is a delay in the
mail, there is a real danger that the tenant will not receive notice at all-
even of the truncated variety noted below. Because, in addition to a
judgment for possession, the landlord can also obtain a money judg-
ment in an unlawful detainer proceeding,1 8 the tenant's constitutional
right to notice may well be violated by this lack of personal service."19
If the tenant does receive adequate notice there are still other
procedural problems. Section 1170 of the Code of Civil Procedure al-
lows the tenant only three days to answer or demur. 2 ' Since the
section does not exclude Saturdays or Sundays or holidays, 121 a sum-
mons served on Friday evening effectively reduces the response
period to one day. 2 If the tenant is employed on Monday, he may
be precluded from obtaining counsel at all. Assuming, however, that
the tenant manages to retain counsel, the three days-let alone one day
-are probably not adequate time for the busy practitioner to prepare
an effective response.
E. Writ of Possession Prior to Trial
Finally, tenants object to section 1166a of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which allows a writ of possession to issue prior to the un-
lawful detainer action if, by a verified complaint or affidavit, the land-
lord satisfies the court that
116. Marin Sheriff Interview, supra note 20.
117. San Francisco Sheriff Interview, supra note 19. See generally N. LE3LANC,
A HANDBOOK OF LANDLORD-TENAN T PROCEDURES AND LAW, WIm FORMS 8-9 (2d ed.
1969) (New York City procedure) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
118. See, e.g., cases cited notes 54-55 supra.
119. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 412, 413, 417. But cf. S.B. 503, 900, passed by
the California legislature in the last session and signed by the Governor. Cal. Stats.
1969, chs. 1610, 1611, at 521, 536 (Deering's Adv. Leg. Serv. No. 8, 1969), which drop
the word "personal" from several California Code of Civil Procedure sections (relating
to service of process), apparently opening the door to increased use of other types of
service.
120. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1167, 1170.
121. Id.
122. This is because of the difficulties in obtaining counsel on Saturday or
Sunday.
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[the tenant] is insolvent, or has no property that is subject
to execution sufficient to satisfy the amount of damages sought to
be recovered by the plaintiff, or resides out of the state; or cannot,
after due diligence be found within the State, or conceals himself
to avoid the service of summons.1
2 3
At least two municipal court decisions"2' have declared this section
to be unconstitutional on due process grounds since there is no pro-
vision for a hearing (due process requiring both notice and a hear-
ing). 2 5
The California Legislature has not been unmindful of this ob-
jection, 12' and in its most recent session, amended section 1166a
127
so that it now requires a pretrial motion by the landlord to obtain
possession prior to the unlawful detainer action. A hearing is required
on the motion, and both parties may present affidavits or oral testi-
mony in support of their positions. The tenant must receive written
notice of the hearing informing him that"12
he may file affidavits on his behalf with the court and may
appear and present testimony on his behalf, and that if he fails
to appear the plaintiff will apply to the court for the writ of
possession.
129
The one shortcoming of this amendment is that it does not de-
scribe the scope of the issues to be heard on the pretrial motion; that is,
the statute does not specify whether the hearing is confined to the
allegations upon which the landlord can obtain the pretrial writ of
possession, 130 or whether the hearing can range beyond those issues.
However, this writer feels that the provision for a hearing in itself
answers the procedural due process objections raised in the two pre-
viously mentioned'3' municipal court decisions that declared sec-
tion 1166a unconstitutional.
123. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1166a.
124. Auburn v. Jons, Civ. No. 623689 (San Francisco Mun. Ct., July 7, 1969);
Dillon v. Cockerell, Civ. No. 109588 (San Francisco Mun. Ct., Sept. 21, 1937) in
The Recorder (San Francisco), Sept. 22. 1937, at 1, cols. 1-3.
125. Auburn v. Jons, Civ. No. 623689 (San Francisco Mun. Ct., July 7, 1969)
cites as authority by analogy: Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969) (striking down a Wisconsin pre-judgment garnishment statute); Mendoza v.
Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958) (declaring small claims
court jurisdiction over unlawful detainer unconstitutional).
126. Letter from Assemblyman James A. Hayes to Dennis C. Poulsen, Sept. 13,
1969, on file with The Hastings Law Journal (Assemblyman Hayes sponsored A.B.
1762 (1969), note 127 infra).
127. Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 903, at 492 (Deering's Adv. Leg. Serv. No. 5, 1969)
(effective Nov. 10, 1969).
128. This notice must be served according to the procedures set out in section 1011
of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
129. Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 903, at 492 (Deering's Adv. Leg. Serv. No. 5, 1969).
130. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1166a.
131. See note 124 & accompanying text supra.
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IM. An Alternative Procedure
We have just examined several fundamental defects in California's
present unlawful detainer procedure. if it is conceded that there is a
need for some expeditious means to recover the possession of real prop-
erty,132 then two courses are open: Either revise the present system, or
substitute a new one. This writer suggests that in light of the extensive
revisions necessitated by the aforementioned defects, and in light of the
difficulty of equitably accommodating both the landlord and the tenant
within the present framework (even if extensively revised), a new sys-
tem is warranted. Accordingly, an outline proposal for such a new
system follows. It is hoped that this new procedure will balance the
competing interests of landlord and tenant more fairly, effectively, in-
expensively, expeditiously, and perhaps, more amicably than the existing
procedure.
A. The Need for a Separate Tribunal
The idea of a separate tribunal to hear and decide landlord-tenant
disputes is not unique;3 3 such a separate body is presently used in
New York City. 134 The advantages of such an arrangement are nu-
merous and varied. First, the problems arising between landlords and
tenants are unique; a good indication of this is the provision for un-
lawful detainer proceedings in the California codesY.5  This suggests
that a body dealing exclusively with, or at least specializing in, land-
lord-tenant problems would be better suited to handle such actions
than the general courts, which on an individual basis may encounter
such actions only occasionally.
Another advantage to the separate tribunal would be a more
rapid calendaring and hearing of the disputes than is now possible.
The expertise and familiarity of the tribunal would help to expedite
matters brought before the court; also, if there were no other matters
competing for its attention, the tribunal could schedule hearings as
quickly as the parties were able to proceed.
A separate tribunal, not pressed by other matters, could also de-
vote more time to the issues before it, while continuing to act with dis-
patch. This would allow both sides of the dispute to be heard in
one expeditious action and would foreclose the "delay" argument that
is presently offered to justify the exclusion of affirmative defenses and
132. This is generally conceded by even the most vigorous opponents of the present
law. See Petitioner's Brief at 18.
133. Comment, Retaliatory Eviction-Is California Lagging Behind?, 18 HAST-
INGS L.J. 700 n.57 (1967).
134. HANDBOOK, supra note 117, at 5.
135. CAL. CIv. CODE § 792; CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 1159-79a.
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counterclaims. 36 If there were a separate tribunal that could calendar
and hear matters more quickly, more time could be devoted to all the
issues and still the time lapse between filing and judgment would be no
greater (and probably less) than with the present system.
There would also be a collateral benefit to the regular courts by
the adoption of a separate tribunal. Under the present system a tenant
must bring a separate action to assert any counterclaims or affirmative
defenses available to him. 37  If the tenant could present such claims
in the original unlawful detainer action, one suit would settle the mat-
ter; and thereby eliminate the need for an additional action by the tenant.
This, in turn, would help alleviate the problem of over-crowded dockets.
B. The Suggested Form of the Separate Tribunal
It will become apparent that the traditionally styled court is not
capable of accomplishing many of the needed reforms in the present
unlawful detainer procedure. 3 Thus, a different organization is de-
sirable.
One possible alternative is a small claims type of court. There is,
however, at least one serious shortcoming to this approach-lack of
counsel. To overcome this due process problem, an absolute right of
appeal from the small claims court decision in the form of a trial de novo
would be needed." 9 To complete the constitutional safeguard, an auto-
matic stay of execution pending appeal would also be necessary. 4 '
Yet, both of these elements-trial de novo and automatic stay-would
cause delay and expense for both parties and would frustrate the ob-
jectives of economy and efficiency.
In any case, it seems undesirable to eliminate representation al-
together despite its substantial presence in the cost picture. If under
the new system, as proposed,' 4' a wide range of defenses and counter-
claims is allowed, some type of professional advice would be necessary
to ensure both parties the full advantage of their respective rights.
It is submitted that a proceeding similar to that used in workmen's
compensation cases would work quite satisfactorily in resolving contro-
136. See generally notes 66-96 & accompanying text supra.
137. See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
138. These reforms include relaxed procedure, independent evidence gathering, no
jury, lay practitioners.
139. See Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 673-74, 321 P.2d 9,
11-13 (1958). The California legislature responded to the suggestion implicit in
Mendoza by amending section 117j of the Code of Civil Procedure to provide for a
trial de novo and an automatic stay pending appeal whenever the small claims court
takes jurisdiction of an unlawful detainer proceeding. Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 1982,
§ 1, at 4589.
140. CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 117j; see note 139 supra.
141. See notes 142-54 & accompanying text infra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
versies between landlords and tenants. The ensuing discussion notes
the features of workmen's compensation procedure that could be used
to advantage in landlord-tenant matters, and points out the relevant
desirability of these features. 42
Workmen's compensation cases are heard by a referee 143-the
jury being dispensed with.144 This immediately reduces the time and
expense levels. More significantly, the referees are not bound by for-
mal procedural rules and can hear almost any evidence that is helpful
in arriving at the truth.4 5 The referee can even gather evidence
himself if he deems it necessary. 40 This discarding of an often use-
less formalism works to both parties' advantage; the truth can be sought
after without the often excessive concern for relevance and hearsay
found in regular court proceedings that confuses, obscures, or even
frightens many litigants.
Perhaps the most significant advantage of a workmen's compen-
sation type proceeding is that a person may be represented by one not
an attorney. While either party may have an attorney, this is not a
requirement; he can be represented by a layman or can represent him-
self. This would allow the development of "paraprofessionals" who
142. An early discussion of the possibility of applying the techniques of work-
men's compensation proceedings to other civil matters can be found in Pillsbury, Ap-
plicability of Methods of Trial and Administration Used in Workmen's Compensation
Proceedings to Certain Civil Actions, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 223 (1930).
143. It should be kept in mind during the ensuing discussion of workmen's
compensation proceedings that whereas individual referees or commissioners may be
(and almost always are) appointed by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
(formerly the Industrial Accident Commission) to conduct hearings and make deci-
sions, CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5309, 5310; Bancroft, Some Procedural Aspects of the
California Workmen's Compensation Law, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 378, 380 (1952) [here-
inafter cited as Bancroft]; CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRAc'rIcE, § 7.18 at
207 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as CEB-WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION]; see CAL. LABOR CODE § 133, the decisions are technically those of the
entire Board, CAL. LABOR CODE § 5315; Bancroft 380 & n.15. For an earlier broad
discussion of this situation see the two connected articles, Gallagher, Power of the
Industrial Accident Commission to Settle Disputes Arising Under Workmen's Compen-
sation Legislation by the Several Acts of Its Members and Deputies, 27 CALIF. L. REV.
241 (1939) and McGovney, The Industrial Accident Commission's Dilemma and a
Proposed Remedy, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 266 (1939). Thus, wherever a statutory power
is noted in the paper as belonging to a referee, the statute is usually phrased in
terms of the entire board.
144. No specific statutory language refers to eliminating a jury trial in workmen's
compensation proceedings. However, the constitutional enabling amendment giving
plenary powers to the California Legislature in this area, CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 21,
has been held to allow this dispensation. Dominguez v. Pendoia, 46 Cal. App. 220,
188 P. 1025 (1920).
145. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5708, 5709; Bancroft, supra note 143, at 388; CEB-
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 143, § 1.5, at 5.
146. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 115, 5701.
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could specialize in practice before the landlord-tenant tribunal and
could thus represent individuals more economically and effectively than
an attorney who only occasionally deals with such matters. 14  Law
students, in clinical programs or otherwise legally active in the com-
munity, could represent persons and gain valuable experience them-
selves as well as give no-cost, effective advice to persons unable or un-
willing to obtain it elsewhere.'
Of course, the primary benefit of "paraprofessional" representa-
tion would be to indigent tenants, who could not otherwise afford
counsel. Nevertheless, the advantage would not be closed to land-
lords; it is likely that the small landlord would also resort either to stu-
dent or other "paraprofessional" counseling.
In addition to the above items, the landlord-tenant tribunal would
want to adopt another feature of the workmen's compensation hearings-
simplified pleadings. 4 9  In general, this would facilitate the process
for both parties and make "paraprofessional" representation more
feasible. Also, no charge should be made for filings by either party.
This is in accord with the present practice in workmen's compensation
cases.
50
It is also important to note that there is no trial de novo from a
referee's decision or a workmen's compensation appeals board de-
cision."' This means, of course, that the informal proceeding lead-
ing to the initial judgment is "real" and not a waste of time or
money.152 This aspect should be carried over to the landlord-tenant
tribunal.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are no default judgments
in workmen's compensation cases. The referee, with his evidence-gath-
ering power' to aid him, will make, if necessary, a determination in the
147. Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low Income Litigant as
Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1657, 1681
(1969) citing NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, PARAPRO-
FESSIONALS IN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS: A FEASIBILITY STUDY (Report to the Le-
gal Services Program of the United States Office of Economic Opportunity, Dec.
1968).
148. A law student is more likely to be thorough and conscientious in representing
such people than a busy attorney who does not consider the fee or experience attrac-
tive.
149. CEB-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 143, §§ 1.5, 6.2; 2 B. Wi-IN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Workmen's Compensation § 126 et seq.
150. CEB-WoRKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 143, § 6.2, at 143-44; Ban-
croft, supra note 143, at 386.
151. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5952; CEB-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note
143, § 12.5, at 362; 2 B. WITKIN, supra note 149, § 138, at 1770.
152. Compare this result with that in small claims court, notes 139-40 & accom-
panying text supra.
153. Note 146 supra.
[Vol. 21
absence of either party. 54  This procedure would be beneficial to the
landlord-tenant tribunal, if -for no other reason than because it would
add another safeguard to both parties' rights should claims of fraud
arise. By making a decision, the referee creates a record of the facts
alleged and also indicates the basis for his decision; both could prove
valuable if a later collateral attack should arise.
There is only one major stumbling block to instituting a work-
men's compensation type proceeding. As was true in adopting this
procedure in the workmen's compensation field, adoption of it in the
landlord-tenant field will require an enabling amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution. 5 This is necessary to overcome the due process
argument raised by dispensing with the jury in the proceeding. The
overall cost and time advantages, however, would seem to outweigh the
political difficulties in obtaining ratification of such an amendment.
C. Substantive Changes in Present Unlawful Detainer Procedure
Accompanying the suggested structural changes, there should also
be some changes in the more substantive aspects of the unlawful detainer
procedure. For example, set-offs, counterclaims, and affirmative de-
fenses should be allowed. Not only would this put the landlord and
tenant back upon equal footing,156 but it would also effect a certain
administrative saving by eliminating the need for a separate suit for
damages by the tenant.157  Nevertheless, such a provision would not
be truly effective unless other substantive changes in California's land-
lord-tenant law were made.
The tenant should not be allowed to waive his rights under Civil
Code sections 1941 and 1942. Together, these sections impose a duty
upon the landlord to maintain tenantable premises and create a con-
comitant right in the tenant to take affirmative action to enforce that
duty. But the landlord's duty is rendered nugatory by statutory lan-
guage'5 8 and court decisions upholding waiver by express agreement.' 55
Considering the legislature's concern for tenantable housing, as expressed
in these statutes, and the social desirability of tenantable housing, it
154. CAL.. LABOR CODE § 5506; see Idaho Maryland Mines Corp. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 174 Cal. App. 2d 693, 697, 345 P.2d 109, 111 (1959).
155. CAL. CONsT. art. 20, § 21.
156. See notes 66-96 & accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 66-96 & accompanying text supra. Of course, by allowing counter-
claims, the constitutional challenge that arises by presently disallowing them is met.
158. "The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must,
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such occu-
pation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenantable
.... " CAL. CIv. CODE § 1941 (emphasis added).
159. E.g., Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 147, 146 P. 423, 424-25 (1915).
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seems inconsistent to allow waiver of the landlord's duty to repair."
In the same vein, retaliatory evictions for reporting uncorrected code
violations to the authorities should be prohibited in furtherance of the
state policy, expressed in Civil Code sections 1941 and 1942, that dwell-
ing premises should be tenantable. This could be accomplished by
providing for a rebuttable presumption of retaliation if an unlawful de-
tainer action follows a reported violation within a specified period of
time. This presumption would aid tenants in defending such actions
and might encourage irresponsible landlords to assume their rightful
responsibility in this area.'
The landlord should be allowed to sue for future damages. This
is particularly desirable in long-term lease situations,162 where a suit at
the end of the term would otherwise be necessary."'0 Since a strong
argument can be made that leases should be treated as contracts un-
der Caifornia law, 6"' (although they are generally not, at present) 65
such a provision for future damages would further this objective and
relieve the landlord from the problem of surrender.6 6 In any case, the
landlord should still be under a duty to mitigate damages to avoid un-
due hardship on the dispossessed tenant. 6 7
The time within which an answer or demurrer must be filed
should be extended from three days'68 to at least seven days, exclud-
ing Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. 9 This would allow a defendant
160. The tenant's problem is compounded when one considers that almost every
California standard form lease contains a covenant waiving the tenant's rights under
sections 1941 and 1942. The tenant's problem is also exacerbated by his inability to
bargain for a lease without the waiver because of the limited supply of alternative hous-
ing. See note 174 & accompanying text infra.
161. Legislation embodying these proposals was introduced during the 1969 Cal-
ifornia legislative session but died in the Senate Judiciary Committee after having
passed the Assembly. A.B. 2069, § 3 (1969). The bill received strong landlord oppo-
sition. A sponsor of the bill is very pessimistic that any such legislation will be passed
by the California legislature in the very near future. Telephone Interview with As-
semblyman Willie Brown, Jr., Sept. 12, 1969.
162. See notes 57-61 supra.
163. See note 58 supra. See generally Coskran, Recovery Based on Future Rent
After Lessee's Breach, 44 L.A. BAR BULL. 199 (Mar. 1969).
164. See generally Harvey supra note 57; Note, The California Lease-Contract
or Conveyance, 4 STAN. L. REV. 244 (1952).
165. Harvey, supra note 57, at 1151.
166. See cases cited notes 59, 61 & accompanying text supra.
167. Cf. note 60 supra. In at least two recent California legislative sessions
bills have been introduced to accomplish these objectives; Senate Bills 101 (1969) and
252 (1967). While neither bill was passed, some optimism exists that such legislation
may be successful during the 1970 session. Discussion at the morning session of the
Cal'fornia Law Revision Commission meeting, held in San Francisco, in the Board
Room of the State Bar Building, Oct. 3, 1969.
168. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1167, 1170.
169. Id. See Interim Hearings on Housing Before the Committee on Governmental
Efficiency and Economy 91 (San Francisco, Dec. 12, 1968).
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adequate time to seek counsel and to prepare his case.170
The law should definitely state that the exemption claims of the
Code of Civil Procedure section 690 and following apply, and should
provide that the person with custody of the tenant's belongings is the
"levying officer"'' upon whom the claim can be served. Such a
definitive statement will clear up the confusion that exists regarding
the intent of the present law.1
7 1
In addition, the law should provide for or encourage arrangements
after judgment wherein the impact of the judgment is apportioned over
a period of time. In other words, if the action was for rent due and
the tenant had withheld it in the good faith belief that it was not yet
due, the landlord should continue the tenant in possession provided he
commences paying full rent and a certain portion of the past due rent
until fully paid. The San Francisco Housing Authority presently em-
ploys such a plan when it obtains a judgment in an unlawful detainer
suit. Instead of enforcing the writ of possession, the authority works
out an arrangement with the tenant to repay as much of the past due rent
as he can afford. 73  This saves the tenant and the landlord the trauma
of eviction yet insures that the landlord will eventually get his money.
Then too, if the landlord does prevail at trial, as a matter of right
there should be a stay of execution pending appeal for the tenant. This
is particularly important in tight housing markets with rising rents, and
the consequent limited availability of reasonable alternative housing.'
74
The appealing tenant should be required, however, to post a bond ade-
quate to cover the disputed rents or the damages sought by the land-
lord. If the dispute is over the landlord's duty to repair, the tenant
should deposit the rent payments in an escrow account in the land-
lord's name. This will not only indemnify the landlord if he wins, but
will provide a fund from which to make the repairs if the tenant pre-
vails. 1
75
Whenever the unlawful detainer action is brought for nonpayment
of rent 1 and the landlord wins, a hardship may nevertheless befall
170. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1167, 1170.
171. Id. § 690.26.
172. See notes 97-109 & accompanying text supra.
173. See Sullivan interview, note 20 & accompanying text supra.
174. See SAN FRANcisco DEPARTMENT OF CrTY PLANNING, ISSUES IN HOUSING--
HOUSING REPORT 2, 9-11, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 32, 34 (July 1969).
175. Cf. CAL. ClV. CODE § 1941, 1942. Note that the withheld rent is for the
purpose of making needed repairs under the code section and is not a windfall to the
tenant. Note also that the present limitation on withholding (one month) is, in
many cases, inadequate to cover the work needed. Consequently, the period-and,
concomitantly, the dollar amount-for withholding should be extended. Safeguards
should be introduced at the same time, however, to insure that the tenant's withholding
is in good faith and not excessive.
176. CA.. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1161(2).
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the landlord if a stay is granted pending the tenant's appeal, and the
landlord consequently fails to receive the monthly rent. This is par-
ticularly true in the case of the small landlord who is hard pressed to
make the monthly mortgage payments. To provide for this type of situ-
ation, it might be desirable to make low-cost rent loans available to
such landlords. If the tenant loses his appeal, he would pay, in addi-
tion to the rent and or damages, the interest on the loan. If the tenant
is successful on appeal, the landlord would return to the lender that
portion of the funds not due and any interest thereon.
If the unlawful detainer action was for breach of a covenant,
177
a temporary restraining order against the tenant might be appropriate.
This would allow the tenant to remain in possession but still protect
the landlord against further damage by the tenant.
In addition to the above changes, there should also be statewide
uniformity relative to the enforcement procedure upon the issuance of
the writ in possession. For example, if the tenant's belongings are left
on the premises 178 or seized under a lien,' the landlord should be
allowed to store them on the premises in a safe area separate from the
rental unit. 18° This technique has the triple virtue of protecting the
tenant's belongings, avoiding moving costs, and allowing the landlord
to re-rent the property without costly delay.
In this same vein, statewide guidelines should be established as to
the detail necessary for an adequate inventory. This would eliminate
the wide variation in practice and cost now found.' The regulation
could also specify that the inventory be taken or verified' 82 by a keeper
-a special deputy hired at a minimal wage.' 8 ' Use of a keeper would
avoid much of the high cost resulting from the prohibitive charges of
professional movers or inventory takers,18 4 and would also provide em-
ployment for retired or disabled persons.
Finally, to minimize the necessary capital outlay, enforcement
agencies should be encouraged to calculate the amount of the deposit
177. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1161(3). There are two other bases for the action:
holding over after the term has expired, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1161(1), or sub-
letting, waste and nuisance, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1161(4).
178. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174; see notes 34-50 supra.
179. CAL. CIV. CODE §H 1861, 1861a.
180. This writer assumes that most buildings will have an empty garage or base-
ment storeroom available for such services.
181. See note 43 supra.
182. See note 42 & accompanying text supra.
183. A keeper for property under execution is authorized by CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 26726. The same provision sets the amount of fees that can be charged for the
keeper. Such a keeper is used in Matin County and has had some success in mini-
mizing fees. Marin Sheriff Interview, supra note 20.
184. See note 44 supra.
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by the use of a per room charge. This is only logical since a per room
deposit relates more closely to the actual costs that will be incurred than
does the nondiscriminating flat fee.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has presented some reasons for revising
California's unlawful detainer procedure and has suggested, in broad
outline form, the direction those changes should take. The intent was
not to be encyclopedic, but rather to stimulate creative thinking in an
area of relevant social concern. Landlord and tenant may never be-
come undying friends but that does not mean they cannot deal with
one another amicably.
Implementation of the plan suggested by this Note wil require
many additional hours of careful research and drafting. However, it is
hoped that the need for, and the feasibility of, such a new system has
been adequately demonstrated. 8 5
Dennis C. Poulsen*
185. On January 5, 1970, a decision was filed in Hutcherson v. Lehtin, Civ. No.
52196 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 1970) (a copy of the decision is on file with The Hastings Law
Journal pending publication in the Federal Supplement), discussed in text accompanying
notes 69-96 supra. The three judge court rejected the equal protection and due process
arguments raised in the petitioner's brief but abstained from deciding the retaliatory
eviction-free speech issue pending a definitive decision by a California court on whether
such a defense is admissible in an unlawful detainer proceeding.
In rejecting the equal protection argument the court relied heavily on Telegraph
Ave. Corp. v. Raentsch, 205 Cal. 93, 97-98, 269 P. 1109, 1111 (1928). Telegraph
was intentionally omitted from this Note since its quoted conclusion was unsupported
by authority or adequate reason and sidestepped the issues that were raised in the
petitioner's brief. For the three judge court to rely on this authority is to compound
the original error and does nothing to diminish the force and logic of the petitioner's
arguments. In rejecting the due process argument the court relied heavily on its
conclusion regarding the equal protection argument-again compounding the error.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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